Copyright 2011 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 105, No. 3

AFTER NATWEST: HOW COURTS SHOULD HANDLE
OECD COMMENTARY IN DOUBLE TAXATION
TREATY INTERPRETATIONS
Brian Caster*
Rufus T. Firefly: Awfully decent of you to drop in today. Do you realize
our army is facing disastrous defeat? What do you intend to do
about it?
Chicolini: I’ve done it already.
Rufus T. Firefly: You’ve done what?
Chicolini: I’ve changed to the other side.
Rufus T. Firefly: So you’re on the other side, eh? Well, what are you
doing over here?
Chicolini: Well, the food is better over here.†
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INTRODUCTION
National Westminster Bank, PLC (NatWest), a British bank that once
had six U.S. branches, sought to dramatically decrease its tax burden within
the United States between 1981 and 1987. The reason was obvious: although the U.S. market is very lucrative, hosting a large number of foreign
bank branches and subsidiaries, the U.S. corporate tax rates for foreign corporations are very high compared to those of other countries.1 For a period
of eight years, NatWest shifted much of its U.S. branches’ profits as “loan
repayments” to its branches in Hong Kong, which had a significantly lower
tax rate, thus decreasing its taxable income on the U.S. branches’ books
through interest deductions.2 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses
these books to determine what amount of capital the branch utilized in connection with its operations, which it then uses to assess that branch’s annual
tax debt.3 When the IRS discovered that NatWest’s U.S. branches were
“borrowing” money from NatWest’s Hong Kong branches and the U.K.
home office, while taking an interest expense deduction for on-the-book interest “payments,”4 it ordered NatWest to pay taxes of over $65 million.5
This disparity arose from NatWest’s calculation of its interest expense,
which the IRS disputed.6 After recalculating, the IRS found NatWest had
an additional $155 million in taxable income for the years 1981 to 1987.7
When the United Kingdom then offered NatWest only a partial foreign tax
credit to cover a portion of the assessed debt, NatWest instead opted to pay
the additional taxes and sue the IRS to recover the full amount of the IRS
reassessment.8 After numerous suits and a final appeal to the Federal Circuit, NatWest received its tax refund.9
1

The U.S. corporate tax rate is on a sliding scale, but for the largest corporations, it can reach 35%.
See John D. McKinnon, No Holiday on Tax Day, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2011, 6:47 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/04/18/no-holiday-on-tax-day (noting that the U.S. corporate tax rate,
which can reach 35%, is “among the world’s highest”). By comparison, the corporate tax rate in Hong
Kong is currently 16.5%. See INLAND REVENUE DEP’T, GOV’T OF THE H.K. SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION,
A BRIEF GUIDE TO TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT 2010–2011, at 1–2
(2010) [hereinafter INLAND REVENUE DEP’T TAX GUIDE], available at http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/pdf/
tax_guide_e.pdf.
2
See David Cay Johnston, British Bank Wins Dispute with the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1999, at
C1.
3
See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d) (as amended in 2010).
4
Johnston, supra note 2; see also Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest I),
44 Fed. Cl. 120, 121–22 (1999) (referring to NatWest’s intracorporate loans and payments in
quotations).
5
See Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest IV), 512 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1349–50.
8
Id. at 1350. Countries often give tax credits to domestic taxpayers with international operations as
a means to offset any double taxation. See I.R.C. § 904 (2006); see also id. § 1(h)(11)(C) (placing a
limitation on foreign tax credit for dividends taxed as net capital gain). Each country determines what
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The courts that presided over these suits all relied on the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports and guides
available in 1975, when the United Kingdom and the United States signed
their treaty on double taxation.10 The courts refused to give anything more
than “minimal deference” to official OECD commentary available after that
date.11 But if courts intend to use these guides and reports as persuasive authority, they should look to subsequent reports and guides that address issues that could not have been foreseen at the time of ratification and give
those materials a level of deference similar that given to materials available
at the time of ratification. This was where NatWest courts went wrong: if
they had looked to recent OECD commentary, they would have seen that
the OECD addressed the issue in favor of the IRS’s interpretation.
When banks create permanent establishments (PEs) like branches or
subsidiaries within other countries, they sculpt their tax planning according
to the terms provided in a treaty between their home country and the country of establishment. These treaties aim to prevent the double taxation of
the income of a single company.12 Double taxation takes place when two
countries, specifically a party’s home country and another country, tax the
same income. Although some scholars maintain that the fear of double taxation is unfounded,13 avoiding it has nonetheless become a core purpose of
tax legislation. Such concerns motivated the OECD to create a model convention for the avoidance of double taxation (Model Treaty).14 The OECD

international income taxes it will offset, see, e.g., § 882(c)(3) (providing where limitations exist on
foreign tax credits in the United States), and as in the case of NatWest, the amount offset does not often
equal a total offset of international income taxes. See NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1350 (discussing how
NatWest concluded it would be liable for $37 million in tax liability without a corresponding tax credit
in the United Kingdom).
9
NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1351–52.
10
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, U.S.–U.K., Dec. 31, 1975, 31 U.S.T. 5668 [hereinafter
U.S.–U.K. Treaty]. This Comment will not discuss the court’s failure to differentiate between the date
that a treaty is signed and the date that the treaty is actually ratified. However, this distinction is
important, since a signed treaty can have no effect until the Senate ratifies it, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2, and thus any reports or commentary available before it is ratified could arguably influence the
language of the treaty.
11
NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1358–59.
12
For example, the treaty at issue in the NatWest litigation between the United States and the
United Kingdom provides in its preamble that it is meant to avoid double taxation and prevent fiscal
evasion of taxes. U.S.–U.K. Treaty, supra note 10, at pmbl.
13
See, e.g., Herwig J. Schlunk, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Double Taxation,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 127, 150–56 (2003) (showing that a double income tax regime can be
equivalent to a single nation’s income tax regime).
14
The Model Treaty is itself called the Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital.
DRAFT DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (Org. for Econ. Co-operation &
Dev. 1963) (updated 2010) [hereinafter MODEL TREATY], in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
REPORT OF THE OECD FISCAL COMMITTEE (1963) [hereinafter MODEL TREATY REPORT].
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frequently updates the Model Treaty language,15 and it also releases reports,
guides, and commentary that address potential conflicts that countries face
when interpreting the language of the Model Treaty.16 A number of countries adopted the language of the Model Treaty, in whole or in part, when
ratifying and adopting their own treaties to prevent double taxation.17 These
include the United States and the United Kingdom, who based their double
taxation treaty on the Model Treaty language.18
The U.S. tax system has responded to the idea of the time value of
money: taxpayers want to pay as little tax as possible now (if ever), and the
government wants as much tax as possible paid now rather than later.19
Corporate entities share this motivation. Obviously, NatWest hoped to pay
as little tax as possible, and it hoped to do so by circumventing the system
put in place by the IRS. When its actions were challenged, NatWest sought
protection from the courts and received it.
The Federal Circuit upheld NatWest’s actions as consistent with the
United States–United Kingdom Treaty on the Prevention of Double Taxation (U.S.–U.K. Treaty),20 affirming three lower court decisions that
spanned a ten-year period. In the first decision, NatWest I,21 the Court of
Federal Claims determined that the Treasury regulation the IRS applied to
calculate NatWest’s attributed profits22 violated the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.23
Four years later, in NatWest II, the court analyzed a new calculation the IRS
proposed to tax the bank.24 But it found that this calculation also violated
the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.25 The Federal Circuit affirmed these decisions, as
15

Its most recent update took place in July 2010. See OECD Approves Updates to Model Tax
Convention, Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (July 22, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/
document/20/0,3343,en_2649_37989746_45689428_1_1_1_1,00.html.
16
See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 2010 REPORT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF
PROFITS TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS (2010).
17
Many U.S. tax treaties with other countries include language practically identical to that of the
Model Treaty. Compare United States Income Tax Treaties—A to Z, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/international/article/0,,id=96739,00.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2011), with MODEL TREATY,
supra note 14 (containing similar structure and language).
18
NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The ‘entire context’ of the 1975 Treaty is
informed by, and is based on, the Office of Economic Cooperation and Development’s (‘OECD’) 1963
Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital . . . .”).
19
See, e.g., Stephen B. Land, Contingent Payments and the Time Value of Money, 40 TAX LAW.
237, 237 (1987) (“Present value concepts invaded the federal income tax law in the early Eighties, when
both practitioners and policymakers recognized the importance of the time value of money in
determining tax burdens.”).
20
NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1349.
21
NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999).
22
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1980). The Treasury regulation determined the allocable amount of
profits to each branch of a foreign bank. See infra Part I.D for a full explanation of this regulation.
23
NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 121.
24
Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest II), 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 492 (2003).
25
Id. at 497–99.
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well as that in NatWest III, but the issue in that case—including whether
NatWest could treat its six U.S. branches as one PE for tax purposes26—is
outside the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed in detail.
In both NatWest I and NatWest II, the court relied on OECD commentary to give meaning to the ambiguous treaty language on the proper way to
attribute profits to PEs. Yet their construction relied on the commentary
and guidance available to both the United States and the United Kingdom at
the time of ratification.27 Although this might initially appear to be a reasonable interpretive strategy—focusing as it does on the ratifying parties’
expectations at the time of entering into the treaty28—it fails to take into account situations that neither party could anticipate at the time of ratification
and whether future commentary was within their expectations. The NatWest I court explained that the OECD drafters intended the commentary to
be used in determining the mutual understanding of countries that created
tax treaties based on the Model Treaty,29 referring to the Model Treaty’s
“detailed Commentaries designed to illustrate or interpret each Article.”30
The NatWest I court did not explain why this language should limit commentary discussion to only the texts available at the time of ratification—
probably because the Model Treaty does not include such limiting language.
The key to understanding the courts’ error is in the operation of the
OECD Model Treaty. Since the inception of the Model Treaty, the OECD
has issued commentary, reports, guides, and other tools to reach an understanding of the treaty language and to resolve conflicts as they arise.31 This
Comment does not argue that courts should actually rely on OECD commentary even if such reliance was the intention of the Model Treaty’s drafters. Rather, it argues that if courts choose to rely on external sources like
commentary to solve issues with respect to the language of the Model Trea-

26

Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest III), 69 Fed. Cl. 128, 140–41 (2005),
aff’d, 512 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
27
NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. at 496–503 (accepting earlier OECD commentary and rejecting later
OECD commentary, after a brief discussion, as “not reflect[ive of] the understanding of the 1975 Treaty
partners”); NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 125 (“The initial explanatory material of the OECD Document and
the Commentaries . . . are important and helpful in determining the probable mutual understanding of
countries which used the Document as the basis for a tax treaty.”).
28
See NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. at 503 (“[W]hile the 2003 Discussion Draft shows the continued
thinking of the OECD on attributing capital to branches and its post-1995 evolving views on arm’s
length principles, the 2003 Discussion Draft does not reflect the understanding of the 1975 Treaty
partners, and is, thus, ultimately irrelevant to the court’s conclusion.”).
29
NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 125.
30
Id. at 125 n.6 (emphasis omitted).
31
The OECD issued new reports on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments in 2008
and 2010 along with new Model Treaty language for Article 7. See Profits of Permanent
Establishments: News & Events, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/
newsEvents/0,3382,en_2649_37989746_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
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ty and its successor ratified treaties, they should look at more than just the
commentary available at the time of a treaty’s ratification.
The NatWest courts left the IRS in a tough position. The U.S.–U.K.
Treaty has since been altered to reflect changes in thinking about the attribution of profits to PEs.32 Yet potential issues unaddressed at the time of a
treaty’s ratification could very likely arise—in fact, we know they do arise
because otherwise there would be no need for subsequent OECD commentary. Courts inevitably face situations in which they must decide whether to
reach opposite decisions on the same treaty language because differing
commentary existed at the differing times of ratification. This Comment
proposes a method for dealing with treaties based on the OECD Model
Treaty: as a matter of consistency, the IRS and any courts interpreting IRS
determinations should look to the entirety of the OECD commentary rather
than treating the Model Treaty as a static concept at the time two countries
adopt its language in their own double taxation treaty.
Part I discusses the role of foreign banks in the United States and how
they are taxed. Part II analyzes the NatWest litigation, including the lower
court decisions and the appellate court affirmation of those decisions. Part
III focuses on the role of the OECD material in litigation. Part IV proposes
a new way for courts to use OECD commentary when interpreting double
taxation treaties. Applying this method, Part IV concludes that the corporate yardstick method would be the best means of assessing a PE’s taxable
income.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Foreign Banks in the United States
Foreign banks maintain a substantial presence in the United States.
Total banking assets in the United States of foreign-related banking institutions exceed $1.98 trillion, and total nonbanking assets are approximately
$2.58 trillion.33 Foreign banks have numerous reasons to enter the U.S.
market, from a desire to provide financial services to corporate clients that
have expanded into the United States to the simple fact that the United
States is “a significant force in international trade,” and thus many international transactions are denominated in U.S. dollars.34 There are several
ways banks can enter the U.S. marketplace. This Comment focuses on two:
the branch and subsidiary forms.
32

See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.–U.K., July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,161
[hereinafter 2001 U.S.–U.K. Treaty].
33
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF
BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 740 (4th ed. 2009).
34
RAJ K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI 25 (1994).
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1. Differences Between Branch and Subsidiary Form.—Under the International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA), Congress attempted to regulate PEs
of foreign banks.35 The IBA permitted foreign banks to create a PE in a
number of ways, including via a branch or subsidiary.36
The term “branch” is defined as “any office or any place of business . . . at which deposits are received.”37 Branches have broad authority to
conduct many types of banking business, such as making loans, issuing letters of credit, and brokering securities.38 The IBA prescribes a pledge of assets as a minimum requirement to open a branch in the United States,39 and
it sets five percent of liabilities as a default.40 But a branch is not separately
capitalized, and it has “no assets that are independent of the foreign bank
parent.”41 In other words, the bank’s home office must pledge a certain
amount of assets, but the branch form does not require that the U.S. branch
itself maintain any of this capital; instead, the capital can remain with the
home office. This gives banks the ability to maintain their bank in the
United States without needing to maintain large amounts of capital in that
branch. Attempting to make the U.S. banking market a leveler playing
field,42 the IBA provided foreign-related banks a regulated method of opening U.S. branches, which put them in roughly equal competitive positions
with domestic bank branches.43
A foreign bank can also create a bank in the form of a subsidiary. Subsidiaries are similar to branches, except they are independently capitalized
and incorporated under state law.44 There are two ways that a foreign bank
can establish a subsidiary: it can acquire an existing U.S. bank, or it can
form a new subsidiary bank de novo.45 Subsidiaries are separately capitalized and subject to state and federal regulations.46

35
36

(7).

12 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3111 (2006).
CARL FELSENFELD, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION 20–21 (2d ed. 2007); see § 3101(3),

37

§ 3101(3).
FELSENFELD, supra note 36, at 21.
39
§ 3102(g)(1).
40
Id. § 3102(g)(2).
41
BHALA, supra note 34, at 28.
42
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-910, at 5 (1978) (“The second objective [of the IBA] is to provide to the
extent possible or appropriate equal treatment for foreign and domestic banks operating in the United
States.”).
43
Edward L. Symons, Jr., The United States Context, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION: CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE 1990S, at 3, 13–14 (J.J. Norton et al. eds.,
1994).
44
BHALA, supra note 34, at 27.
45
Id.
46
Id.
38
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Historically, most foreign banks in the United States have chosen to
operate in branch form rather than through a subsidiary.47 The branch form
presents certain tax-related and non-tax-related advantages over the subsidiary form. The branch form prevents the branch from being subject to any
federal or state lending limitations because the branch’s capital is still under
the control of the head office.48 A U.S. subsidiary of a foreign bank, on the
other hand, “must be newly capitalized at the time of its formation.”49 Further, when a subsidiary repays its home office for any capitalization provided, the return payment in the form of interest or dividends may be
subject to taxation that is not offset with any tax credits from the home
country.50 Finally, foreign bank branches are not required to obtain federal
deposit insurance so long as they restrict their deposit operations to foreign
activities and do not accept deposits of below $100,000.51
2. Double Taxation Treaties and Bank Branches.—Double taxation
treaties seek to eliminate a potential circular transaction: First, a foreign
bank with a U.S. branch is subject to income tax in its home country on its
entire worldwide income. Then, the foreign bank is subject to income tax
in the United States for its branch. Finally, the foreign bank’s home country provides it with tax credits to offset the amount paid to the United
States. Such circular transactions can often occur in the banking context,
especially with deductions for interest expenses. Countries implement
double taxation treaties in their tax policies to minimize this type of transaction.
There are, generally speaking, two regimes under which the IRS can
tax the income of foreign banks in the United States. The IRS first determines whether the income is actually connected to the U.S. branch. If so,
the IRS taxes that income as it would any income of a domestic corporation.52 When the IRS determines the income is not sufficiently connected to
the activities of the U.S. branch, it then seeks to determine the source of the
income.53 Unconnected income consisting of interest yields a thirty percent
tax rate—although double taxation treaties almost always preempt this.54
47

Alfred C. Groff & James F. Hoch, Selected Issues in U.S. Taxation of U.S. Branches of Foreign
Banks, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 343, 343. Because the SEC rules do not apply to branches and because
branches are themselves merely an “extension” of the head office, the head office will be responsible for
any monetary issues that arise. A subsidiary is a separately incorporated institution within the United
States, though, so its funds are distinct from its head office’s.
48
Id. at 344.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 33, at 742.
52
Groff & Hoch, supra note 47, at 344–47.
53
Id.
54
See id. The United States has such treaties with, for example, the Netherlands, Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, U.S.–Neth., Dec. 18, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-6; Austria, Convention for the Avoidance
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Most treaties explicitly provide that interest in the parent–branch context is not subject to taxation in the foreign country. If, for example, two
countries each have a bank that has one foreign branch in the other country,
their treaty would provide that interest on loans between the branch and
parent is nontaxable. Otherwise, each of the banks would pay tax on the interest and then would receive compensation from their home country in the
form of a foreign tax credit. The end result would be the governments of
each country collecting the same (or, at least, a similar) amount of tax and
then giving out that same amount of money to the bank in the form of a foreign tax credit.
Double taxation treaties do not always cover the entirety of interest expense. Where they do not, a branch has an incentive to treat the income as
effectively connected. Foreign banks operating in the United States can deduct this additional interest expense from their effectively connected income—in other words, from their taxable income.55 So when a double taxataxation treaty does not deflect all taxes on a branch’s interest expense, the
branch would desire it to be effectively connected—and thus deductible on
another front.
B. The OECD
When the United States and the United Kingdom entered into a treaty
for the avoidance of double taxation, both parties relied on the Model Treaty Convention of the OECD. The OECD56 formed in 1961 to help its member countries achieve sustainable economic growth.57 Thirty countries are
member nations of the OECD, including both the United States and the
United Kingdom.58 Although the OECD lacks formal lawmaking powers, it
does issue reports, recommendations, and analyses on which member nations may rely when determining international monetary policy.59 This
commentary was intended to “be of great assistance in the application of the
Conventions and, in particular, in the settlement of eventual disputes.”60

of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.–
Austria, May 31, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-31; and the United Kingdom, 2001 U.S.–U.K. Treaty,
supra note 32.
55
Groff & Hoch, supra note 47, at 346.
56
A number of terms used by the OECD, including the term “Organization” in its name, are spelled
in British English with an “s” instead of a “z.” Due to the NatWest courts’ reliance on the “z” spelling
of these terms, this Comment will employ all of the “z” spellings.
57
See History, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_
36734052_36761863_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
58
For a complete list of all member nations and partner nations of the OECD, see Members and
Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_
36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
59
FELSENFELD, supra note 36, at 272.
60
MODEL TREATY REPORT, supra note 14, at 18.
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The prospect of double taxation is a major concern for the OECD because it has the potential to stifle global expansion and burden member
countries.61 Double taxation of the combined economic profits of related
corporations can occur “whenever countries use different allocation methods or use the same method but produce different transfer prices or different profits allocable to the corporations.”62 Such concerns gave rise to
international efforts to develop a common allocation norm.63
In 1963, the OECD developed the Model Treaty.64 Its drafters attempted to guide member nations on how to format treaties between each
other both to ensure that each country received its due taxes and to prevent
61

See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income
Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1767–69 (1999) (discussing the American corporate
“double” taxation system and its potential to stifle growth within the United States).
62
Brian D. Lepard, Is the United States Obligated to Drive on the Right? A Multidisciplinary
Inquiry into the Normative Authority of Contemporary International Law Using the Arm’s Length
Standard as a Case Study, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 43, 52 (1999). The IRS relies on two methods
to determine interest expense: formulary apportionment and separate accounting. When countries differ
in their method of accounting, it can result in large tax windfalls or steep tax burdens for different
international companies, depending on the countries in which they operate PEs.
The separate accounting method treats the parent and the PE as operating completely separate
businesses in completely different settings. For example, imagine a Japanese car manufacturer with a
PE located in Bulgaria, where corporate tax is very low. Now imagine that the car manufacturer
produces a car for $5000 in Japan with a retail price of $25,000 in foreign markets. Under the separate
accounting principle, the Japanese parent has an incentive to sell each car to its foreign PEs for as close
to $5000 as possible, leaving little taxable profit in the Japanese parent and shifting most of the profit to
the Bulgarian PE, where it will be taxed at the country’s low tax rate.
The formulary apportionment method treats the parent and PE as operating a single business of
manufacturing and selling cars. Their combined income per car would be $20,000 (retail price less
manufacturing costs). Now assume that the formula takes into account only payroll. If the Japanese
parent and Bulgarian PE have payrolls of $900,000 and $100,000, respectively, then 90% ($900,000 ÷
$1,000,000) of the combined income of $20,000 per car (that is, $18,000) would be allocated to the
Japanese parent. The remaining 10% of combined income ($2000) would be allocated to the Bulgarian
PE for taxation purposes.
From these examples, it becomes clear why two countries with opposite accounting methods could
create both positive and negative consequences for different multinational companies. Consider, for
example, that the Japanese parent sells cars to its Bulgaria PE for $5,000. If Japan’s government then
decides to apply a formulary apportionment method and Bulgaria’s government sticks with the separate
accounting method, the result would be $18,000 of double taxation. Japan’s formulary apportionment
method would attribute $18,000 of that car’s profits to the Japanese parent, and Bulgaria would tax the
PE to the tune of $20,000 for its separate allocation. The result is tax on $38,000 despite an actual profit
of only $20,000.
If Japan were to apply a separate accounting method and Bulgaria a formulary apportionment
method, the opposite would happen: a tax windfall to the car manufacturer. The Japanese parent would
have no taxable profit (because it sold the car for the $5000 it cost to manufacture), and the Bulgarian
PE would have $2000 of taxable income (its apportioned profit in the above example) taxed at
Bulgaria’s far lower corporate rate.
These examples are adapted from several examples in Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(6) (as amended in
1996).
63
Lepard, supra note 62, at 52.
64
MODEL TREATY, supra note 14.
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double taxation of multinational corporations.65 As noted above, if every
country maintained the same accounting method and operated under the
same treaty, there would theoretically be no opportunity for double taxation
or tax windfalls. Although not binding on any member nations, the Model
Treaty proved influential when member nations drafted their own treaties
for the purposes of avoiding double taxation.66
Article 7 of the Model Treaty contains the language pertinent to the attribution of profits to a PE. Of particular relevance is Article 7(2):
Where an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated [t]herein, there
shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment
the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar
conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is
a permanent establishment.67

Under the Model Treaty, the branch of a foreign corporation is to be treated
as if it were “distinct and separate,” dealing “wholly independently” with its
head office. This language proved the most contentious: what, after all,
does it mean to operate distinctly from a parent company? The PE filing
taxes must replicate this tax fiction because branches necessarily deal with
their parents. A branch could look to its books and those of its parent to establish its independent operations. But as the NatWest I court noted when
referring to Article 7’s commentary, the business records and the facts as
they appear therein should be adjusted when the actual facts are different.68
A further problem with interpreting the “distinct and separate” language is that, when a PE receives funds from its parent company, adjustments must be made for tax purposes so that these transactions appear to be
at “arm’s length” rates.69 “Arm’s length” looks to whether the parent company would have entered into the same transaction with an actually independent, similarly situated entity; if not, it then asks what the actual rate
would have been.70 For example, if NatWest loaned money to its subsidiaries at a lower interest rate, “arm’s length” would ask what interest rate
NatWest would have offered the branch of another bank. Such adjustments
65

See MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 7–9 (Org. for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 MODEL TREATY], available at http://www.oecd.org/
document/28/0,3746,en_2649_33747_41231132_1_1_1_1,00.html. The 2008 version, unlike the 1963
Model Treaty, lays out the historical background that led to its formation. Id. It recognized the growing
interdependence of the member nations and the increasing need to implement measures to prevent
international double taxation.
66
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
67
MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 45–46, art. 7, para. 2.
68
NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. 120, 126 (2009) (citing MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 82–83).
69
See MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 82–83, art. 7, cmts. 11–12.
70
See id. at 82, art. 7, cmt. 12 (“[I]t will usually be appropriate to substitute for the prices used
ordinary market prices for the same or similar goods supplied on the same or similar conditions.”).
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are necessary to reflect the economic reality that PEs are not actually independent and distinct. There are limitations to this approach. NatWest is a
good example why: its PEs could rely on its strong credit rating to secure
loans that actually independent branches could not, and for tax purposes, no
adjustment is made for this distinction. Although flawed, this approach best
replicates the economic reality of how PEs operate. Tellingly, it was the
IRS’s measuring the NatWest branches via “similarly situated” branches
that the NatWest II court rejected.71
C. The U.S.–U.K. Treaty
The United States and the United Kingdom first entered into a treaty
on the prevention of double taxation on December 31, 1975.72 Both countries relied heavily on the Model Treaty, and large portions of the U.S.–
U.K. Treaty repeat the Model Treaty language verbatim. The language of
both treaties’ Article 7(2) is practically identical.73 The language of Article
7(3) diverges only slightly between the two. For example, the Model Treaty describes “purposes of the permanent establishment” as including “executive and general administrative expenses so incurred.”74 Yet the U.S.–
U.K. Treaty goes into greater depth as to which of these executive and general administrative expenses are deductible, elaborating on the various costs
that go into operating a PE.75
Article 3 of both the Model Treaty and the U.S.–U.K. Treaty allows for
the domestic law of the country to determine the meaning of any terms left
undefined.76 Because the U.S.–U.K. Treaty does not define the phrase “reasonable allocation,” each of the countries applies its own domestic law to
give meaning to this term.
D. Evolution of the Taxing Regime in the United States
In 1980, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued Regulation 1.8825 in its current form, which governs the apportionment of the interest expense of foreign corporations engaged in business in the United States.77
The Regulation begins by explicitly disregarding loans and credit transac71

NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 502 (2003) (discussing the 2001 Discussion Draft).
The U.S.–U.K Treaty took effect on April 25, 1980. U.S.–U.K. Treaty, supra note 10.
73
Compare id. art. 7(2), with MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 45–46, art. 7, para. 2 (containing
only two minor differences, one a substitution of “therein” for “herein” and the other an explicit
reference to the provisions Article 7(3)).
74
MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 46, art. 7, para. 3.
75
The U.S.–U.K. Treaty goes on to say,“including a reasonable allocation of executive and general
administrative expenses, research and development expenses, interest, and other expenses incurred for
the purposes of the enterprise as a whole (or the part thereof which includes the permanent
establishment).” U.S.–U.K. Treaty, supra note 10, art. 7(3).
76
Id. art. 3, para. 2; MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 42, art. 3, para. 2.
77
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1980).
72
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tions among branches of the same foreign corporation.78 The Regulation
then applies a three-step formula to determine the allowable interest deduction.79 This was particularly pertinent in the case of NatWest’s U.S.
branches, which deducted the interest expense from “loans” they received
from the home office and Hong Kong.80
Under step one, “asset determination,” the IRS assesses the average total value of all assets of the branch that “generate, have generated, or could
reasonably have been or be expected to generate income, gain, or loss effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United
States.”81 Except for noting that all values would be in U.S. dollars,82 the
Regulation does not discuss a number of factors important to making such a
determination, such as which items should be excluded or included in the
definition of a U.S. “asset” or the status of assets acquired to artificially increase U.S. assets.
Step two, “determining liabilities,” provides more direction to branches
making the determination than the first step but leaves several key areas
ambiguous. The Regulation determines liabilities by multiplying the asset
value from the first step by one of two ratios: a fixed ratio or the actual ratio.83 For banks, the fixed ratio of assets to liabilities is 5%; for all other
businesses, 50%.84 The Regulation gives banks the option of choosing to
use its actual ratio or the default one.85 If a branch opts to use the actual ratio method, that branch would determine the average total amount of corporate worldwide liabilities and the average total value of corporate
worldwide assets.86 When a bank branch is considered undercapitalized like
NatWest’s U.S. branches,87 that branch will have a very low ratio for tax
purposes. As a result, the branch will have very little “capital” for which it
owes tax. The Regulation offers little guidance on essential factors, such as
which country’s tax principles would control the determination, which
items would be classified as liabilities or assets, and how a branch should
properly classify its interbranch transactions.
Finally, under step three, the Treasury allows for an interest deduction.88 A taxpayer makes this calculation under either the “branch
78

Id. § 1.882-5(a)(5).
Id. § 1.882-5(a).
80
See supra text accompanying note 2.
81
§ 1.882-5(b)(1).
82
Id.
83
Id. § 1.882-5(b)(2).
84
See id. § 1.882-5(b)(2)(i).
85
See id. § 1.882-5(b)(2).
86
Id. § 1.882-5(b)(2)(ii).
87
See infra Part II (discussing the NatWest litigation and the IRS’s claims that the branches were
undercapitalized).
88
§ 1.882-5(b)(3).
79
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book/dollar pool method” or the “separate currency pools method”;89 the
IRS applied the “branch book/dollar pool method” to NatWest’s books.90
II. THE NATWEST LITIGATION
NatWest is based in the United Kingdom and engages in “a wide range
of banking, financial and related activities throughout the world.”91 NatWest has 3600 branches worldwide.92 Six of these permanently established
bank branches were within the United States during the years at issue in the
NatWest litigation.93 In addition to these branches, NatWest also maintained a subsidiary within the United States, called National Westminster
Bank U.S.A.94
The U.S. branches received the funds necessary to conduct their business by borrowing from either NatWest’s head office in the U.K. or other
NatWest branches.95 The U.S. branches were also able to borrow from other banks and lending institutions.96 With these borrowed funds, the U.S.
branches lent money to customers and occasionally to other NatWest
branches, thereby generating interest income.97
The IRS stopped treating this shifting of funds as interbranch lending
for tax purposes when NatWest’s U.S. branches sent large sums of money
to branches in Hong Kong, where tax rates were significantly lower than
those in the United States.98 At the same time, NatWest began to deduct the
interest expense on these “loans.”99 Because the IRS taxed all PEs under
the Regulation, the IRS would have assessed a tax based on the amount of
actual capital held by each branch.100 Consequently, the IRS would not
have been able to make an accurate tax determination if a branch shifted its
funds to another jurisdiction and left little to no capital on the books. Because NatWest’s branches could remove these “loans” from their books by
shifting the funds to Hong Kong, the capital amounts on the books were extremely low—the NatWest courts put the amounts consistently below
89

Id. § 1.882-5(b)(3)(i)–(ii).
NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
91
NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. 120, 121 (1999).
92
About Us, NATWEST, http://www.natwest.com/global/about-us.ashx (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
93
NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 495 (2003). The six branches were the New York branch; the
Nassau, Bahamas branch; the Cayman Islands branch; the International Banking Facility (IBF) branch;
the Chicago branch; and the San Francisco branch. Id. The New York branch operated the IBF, Nassau,
and Cayman Islands branches. Id. at 495 n.7.
94
Id. at 495.
95
NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 121.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
The corporate tax rate in Hong Kong, for example, is currently 16.5%. See INLAND REVENUE
DEP’T TAX GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1–2.
99
Johnston, supra note 2.
100
For a description of the taxing structure under this version of the Regulation, see supra Part I.D.
90
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1.75% of total assets.101 If the IRS were to rely strictly on the NatWest
branches’ books, the branches’ taxable income would not reflect the economic reality: these “loans” to Hong Kong were merely a shift in capital to
reduce their tax burden.
U.S. branches of foreign banks are not required by regulation to maintain any minimum amount of capital. Yet the capital that a branch actually
requires to finance its day-to-day operations is part of the IRS’s determination of what taxes that branch owes. Over the years in question, NatWest’s
books had designated capital ratios for U.S. branches ranging from 0.76%
to 1.75%.102 These amounts are much lower than the capital required to actually operate a PE. By comparison, NatWest’s U.S. subsidiary, which was
required to follow SEC regulations, consistently had on its books a capital
ratio of between 6.03% and 7.19%.103
After the IRS audited NatWest, it increased the branches’ taxable income by approximately $155 million for the seven-year period from 1981
to 1987.104 NatWest faced an additional tax liability of more than $65 million—though corresponding U.K. tax credits covered some of this increase.105 The IRS reached this amount by applying the articulated threestep formula of the Regulation to reformulate NatWest’s proper interest expense deduction. Under this approach, which will be discussed in greater
detail below, the IRS calculated NatWest’s capital ratio based on the bank’s
worldwide liabilities and assets, thus allowing the U.S. branches’ proper interest deduction to include the profits NatWest shifted and exclude interest
on the “loans” from the branches’ home office and Hong Kong branches.106
Subsequently, in 1996, NatWest sued the U.S. government, claiming it
overpaid its taxes and was entitled to a refund. Its argument, which the
NatWest I and NatWest II courts and the Federal Circuit accepted, was that
the Regulation, adopted in 1980 and enacted in 1981, was inconsistent with
the preexisting 1975 U.S.–U.K. Treaty.107 Both the NatWest I and NatWest
II decisions, which were affirmed by the Federal Circuit, precluded the IRS
from using a necessary tool in its arsenal to fight tax avoidance.
The central problem with the NatWest courts’ interpretation is that it
treats NatWest’s interbranch transactions as done at arm’s length. To characterize any of these interbranch transactions as reflecting arm’s length
terms and pricing is an economically untenable position. A NatWest
branch would very likely provide a lower interest rate to its sister branches
than it would to a branch of a different bank especially because NatWest’s
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 495 (2003).
Id.
Id.
NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1349. The U.K. tax credits did not cover $37 million of this tax increase. Id. at 1350.
See id. at 1351 (discussing the application of Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1980)).
NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. 120, 121–22 (1999).
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head office maintained all of the U.S. branches’ capital. Typical creditor
concerns, which lead to higher interest rates, would not exist.
A. NatWest I Litigation
The NatWest I court held that the three-step formula of the Regulation,
which the IRS employed to make a worldwide determination of NatWest’s
assets and liabilities, was inconsistent with the “separate enterprise” provisions of Article 7 of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.108 Analyzing the text of the
U.S.–U.K. Treaty, the court determined that Article 7 treats U.S. branches
as independent, separate entities.109 According to the court’s analysis, these
independent entities deal at arm’s length with other units of NatWest “as if
they were wholly unrelated” except that the branches could deduct a reasonable allocation of home office expense.110 While the court noted that
commentaries and reports contemporaneous with the signing of the U.S.–
U.K. treaty generally supported its interpretation,111 it did not even mention
the subsequent commentary on the attribution of profits to PEs. Other
NatWest courts noted that subsequent commentary supported the IRS’s position but rejected the commentary as not reflective of the signatory parties’
understanding.112 But what if the signatory parties understood that the
OECD would release future commentary to address issues that it could not
have anticipated in 1963?
Turning to the 1963 OECD Commentary on Article 7, the court found
that “where the books of account of a permanent establishment are, with adjustments, adequate to determine the profits . . . of the permanent establishment as a separate entity, then those books should be used (and
presumably not some substituted formula).”113 The court quotes language
that it treats as dispositive: “[I]t is always necessary to start with the real
facts of the situation as they appear from the business records . . . .”114 The
very language—to “start” with the business records—implies that, where
the business records do not provide the facts as they truly exist, a proper
analysis must turn to external facts. And to gauge NatWest’s actual situation, the IRS had turned to the three-step formula of the Regulation, an approach the NatWest courts rejected.
The court turned to further language in the commentary on Article 7
about adjustments made to reflect arm’s length transactions.115 After sifting
108

Id. at 121.
Id. at 123–24.
110
Id. at 124.
111
Id.
112
See, e.g., NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 502–03 (2003) (rejecting the 2003 commentary supporting
the IRS’s position as not reflective of the signatory parties’ understanding).
113
NatWest I, 44 Fed. Cl. at 126.
114
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL TREATY, supra note 14, at 82).
115
Id. at 126–27.
109
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through a plethora of commentary discussing the need to adjust the
branches’ books to reflect these types of transactions, the court did not offer
any help in formulating the best means for the IRS to make such an adjustment. The IRS would have to make some sort of adjustment; NatWest’s interbranch transactions were clearly not done at arm’s length. The court may
have remained silent because it recognized that, although the formula used
in the NatWest audit was inappropriate, the IRS would inevitably need to
use some type of formula to determine adjustments to reflect arm’s length
transactions. Because the court’s opinion criticized the application of the
IRS’s proposed formula, however, the court could not very well impose one
itself especially because it lacks the IRS’s expertise in this area.
Finally, the court laid out its reasons for finding the Regulation inconsistent with the U.S.–U.K. Treaty. First, the Regulation’s computation of
the interest expense deduction “disregard[ed] all interbranch transactions,
even for banking operations.”116 Because the Treaty required each branch
be treated as an independent and separate entity, the NatWest I court reasoned that all transactions, including interbranch ones, must be used in the
calculation of assets and liabilities.117 At the same time, however, NatWest’s interbranch transactions were hardly those that would be made by an
independent entity: independent entities would not shift profits to another
company as a repayment of a “loan” they never received. Second, the IRS
computed the Regulation’s second and third steps “on the basis of worldwide assets and worldwide liabilities of the entire foreign enterprise, rather
than determining the interest deduction on the basis of the separate, independent operations” of the branches.118 Again, the NatWest I court refused
to allow the IRS to avoid the independent and separate aspect of the Article 7 language even though NatWest’s shifting of funds between branches
bore no resemblance to the actions of actual independent entities.
B. NatWest II Litigation
After its defeat in NatWest I, the IRS searched for a new way to avoid
refunding the taxes paid by the NatWest branches. The IRS’s revised approach to attributing profits to the NatWest branches was the “corporate
yardstick” method. Under this method, the IRS would have applied the
capital ratio that a branch would have if it were independently incorporated.119 Again, knowing that NatWest’s interbranch “loans” hardly constituted transactions that would occur between two actual independent parties,
the IRS looked for a way to adjust NatWest’s U.S. income. The IRS relied
on the “separate and distinct” language of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty,120 finding
116
117
118
119
120

Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 495–96 (2003).
Id. The relevant language of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty reads:
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that the treaty allowed it to attribute to a branch “the amount of capital that
a separately-incorporated bank of the same size as the branch would likely
hold.”121 Relying on an expert report, the IRS proposed a capital ratio of assets to liabilities of between 6% and 7%.122 The calculated corporate
yardstick capital ratio was far closer to the amount NatWest allocated to its
U.S. subsidiary than the paltry 0.76% ratio it claimed for its U.S. branches.
In the IRS’s opinion, the new ratio also better reflected the treaty language
that says such an enterprise is treated as “dealing wholly independently”
with its home office and other branches, at least for tax purposes.123
Yet the NatWest II court still found that this method violated the U.S.–
U.K. Treaty. It determined that the plain meaning of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty
did not permit the government to impute capital to a branch.124 Rejecting
the IRS’s approach, the court determined that “separate and distinct” means
“separate and distinct from the rest of the bank of which it is a part”125 and
thus determined that Article 7 only allowed the IRS “to adjust the books
and records of the branch to ensure that transactions between the branch and
other portions of the foreign bank [we]re properly identified and characterized for tax purposes.”126 Using the branch books as the starting point, the
NatWest II court found that imputing such capital went beyond the scope of
the adjustments the U.S.–U.K. Treaty allowed.127 Adjustments were permissible to ensure that interest payments reflected an arm’s length relationship—which, in NatWest’s case, did not actually exist. Yet the court
rejected the IRS’s reliance on “‘hypothetical’ infusions of capital” to adjust
the NatWest branches’ capital ratios, finding such adjustments impermissible under the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.128
C. NatWest IV Federal Circuit Litigation
In 2008, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals considered arguments for
and against all three lower court NatWest decisions.129 It addressed the
same concerns discussed in the lower courts: the taxation of interest expense on intracorporate loans and the allocation of capital to the U.S.
[T]here shall . . . be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits which it might be
expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar
activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the
enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.
U.S.–U.K Treaty, supra note 10, art. 7(2) (emphasis added).
121
NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. at 497.
122
Id. at 495–96.
123
Id. at 495.
124
Id. at 497.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 497–98.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 498.
129
NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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branches.130 The government appealed the rulings of all three NatWest decisions, arguing that not only was the IRS’s determination based on NatWest’s worldwide liabilities and assets under the Regulation consistent with
the U.S.–U.K. Treaty but also that the proposed corporate yardstick method
of NatWest II conformed with the treaty’s language.131
The appellate court began by affirming the NatWest I decision.132 First,
the court outlined what it considered to be the relevant commentary to Article 7 of the OECD Model Treaty. Because both the United States and the
United Kingdom would have relied on the 1963 OECD Commentary at the
time in which they entered into the Treaty, the court found this understanding to be the proper means of guidance for the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.133 Analyzing the treaty according to this Commentary, the court ultimately agreed
with NatWest’s argument that the three-step formula of Regulation 1.882-5
was inconsistent with the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.134 Like the Court of Federal
Claims in NatWest I, the Federal Circuit disregarded as irrelevant any
commentary on the attribution of profits to PEs issued subsequent to the
signing of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty in 1975 even though the IRS regulation in
question was not enacted until 1981. Because the post-1975 commentary
did not exist at the time the two nations entered into the Treaty, the court
did not consider it relevant.135
The Federal Circuit next turned to the NatWest II decision, rejecting
the government’s efforts to apply the corporate yardstick method to impute
capital to NatWest’s U.S. branches.136 The court agreed with NatWest’s interpretation of Article 7(2) of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty, which focused on the
Article’s “same or similar conditions” language.137 The government tried to
emphasize the Article’s “dealing wholly independently with” phrase.138 The
IRS’s approach refused to treat the interbranch transactions as the U.S.
branches dealing wholly independently with their home office and Hong
Kong sister branches.139
130

See id. at 1351.
Id. at 1353. The IRS raised a third argument on appeal concerning discovery of the NatWest
head office’s books, id., but this argument was not addressed in any lower court decision and will not be
addressed here.
132
Id. at 1359.
133
Id. at 1358–59.
134
Id. at 1359.
135
Id. at 1358–59.
136
Id. at 1362.
137
Id. at 1360.
138
Id. The language of Article 7(2) reads as follows:
[T]here shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits
which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the
same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently
with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.
U.S.–U.K Treaty, supra note 10, art. 7(2).
139
See NatWest IV, 512 F.3d at 1360–61.
131
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The court determined, however, that NatWest’s interpretation more accurately comported with the treaty. The “wholly independently” language,
the court said, required that any interbranch transactions be “accurately characterized and reflect arm’s length terms and pricing.”140 It did not require
that the U.S. branches be treated as if they were subject to SEC and market
requirements.141 Yet without being able to impute capital to NatWest or
look to NatWest’s worldwide income, how could the IRS possibly make adjustments to accurately characterize the transactions? The Federal Circuit
did not say. Recent OECD commentary, though, does, and the corporate
yardstick is just such a means.
III. LOOKING TO THE COMMENTARY IN ITS ENTIRETY
The OECD frequently releases new discussion drafts and commentary.142 It develops these documents to assist countries in their interpretation
of the Model Treaty as new and previously unforeseeable conflicts arise.143
In 2008, for example, the OECD released a discussion draft of a new Article 7 to its Model Treaty.144 Then, in July 2010, the OECD released the final language of the new Article 7 of the Model Treaty.145 As countries like
the United States continue to rely on the Model Treaty language when crafting their own double taxation treaties,146 it is important to note that the
OECD continues to publish new guidance to assist in the interpretation of
such treaties. Section A of this Part notes that the drafters very much intended for those relying on the Model Treaty to apply any commentary that
became available to address certain unforeseen issues. Section B argues

140

Id.
Id.
142
A quick survey of the available documents on the OECD’s website shows that in 2008 alone the
OECD released the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital - Articles 7, 11, 24, 25, and 26;
the report on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments; a discussion draft on a New Article 7
(Business Profits) of the OECD Model Treaty Convention; and a discussion draft on the Transfer
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings.
143
The new Article 7, for example, attempts to incorporate into its language the different problems
and solutions the OECD addressed in its Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments. See OECD Approves Updates to Model Tax Convention, Transfer Pricing Guidelines
and Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. (July 22, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_37989746_45689428_1_1_1_
1,00.html.
144
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DISCUSSION DRAFT ON A NEW ARTICLE 7 (BUSINESS
PROFITS) OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
37/8/40974117.pdf.
145
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE 2010 UPDATE TO THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/43/45689328.pdf.
146
See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.–Japan, Nov. 6, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-14
(updating the U.S.–Japan Treaty in compliance with the Model Treaty’s language).
141
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that uniformity among countries benefits not only the OECD but also the
economy in general.
A. Interpretive Methodology: Shared Expectations
The NatWest courts, citing to the “Contracting State” language of the
U.S.–U.K. Treaty, used a theory of contract interpretation and therefore only gave strong deference to commentary available in 1975.147 Its interpretive methodology is inherently flawed because treaties like that at issue in
the NatWest litigation are unique in that they evolve. The Model Treaty
and the subsequent treaties adopting its language are not one-off treaties
like declarations of peace between warring nations. The Model Treaty is an
evolving document,148 and the OECD releases subsequent commentary and
drafts precisely to address unforeseen issues. As the Model Treaty evolves,
the United States will likely base future treaty language on the most recent
version. U.S. courts should at least consider all OECD commentary relevant to the issue before them because the OECD’s continual release of updated commentary is part of the treaty countries’ “shared expectations.”
Interpreting the Model Treaty by using only “the understanding of the
1975 Treaty partners,”149 the NatWest courts ignored years of subsequent
answers to problems and situations that OECD member nations encountered
and wanted addressed. The decision of NatWest II court, unlike other decisions made by that court, acknowledged the existence of the OECD’s
evolving views.150 The rejection of these arguments as diverging from the
“genuine shared expectations”151 of the United States and the United Kingdom misinterprets the countries’ shared expectations. Both are member nations of the OECD.152 Article 3 of the OECD Convention, which both the
United States and the United Kingdom ratified, states that member nations

147

See NatWest IV, 512 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See 2008 MODEL TREATY, supra note 65, at 8 (“The Fiscal Committee of the OECD had
envisaged, when presenting its Report in 1963, that the Draft Convention might be revised at a later
stage following further study. Such a revision was also needed to take account of the experience gained
by Member countries in the negotiation and practical application of bilateral conventions, of changes in
the tax systems of Member countries, of the increase in international fiscal relations, and of the
development of new sectors of business activity and the emergence of new complex business
organisations at the international level.”).
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NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 503 (2003).
150
See id. at 499–503 (discussing the 1984 Report on the Taxation of Multinational Banking
Enterprises, the 2001 Discussion Draft on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, and
the 2003 Discussion Draft on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments: Part II (Banks)).
The court ultimately rejected the use of any of this subsequent commentary, though, because it did not
reflect the “genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties.” Id. at 502 (quoting Maximov v.
United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962)).
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Id. at 502 (quoting Maximov, 299 F.2d at 568).
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See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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will “consult together on a continuing basis,”153 conducting studies and addressing issues as they arise.154 When the two countries adopted the treaty,
both were fully aware of the OECD’s operations and its commentaries and
discussion drafts. It seems a stretch to say that the United States and the
United Kingdom did not expect that the OECD would continue to release
commentary to address new problems as they arose.
B. In Violation of OECD Principles
Favorable tax treatment for certain nations violates several principles
of the OECD. As noted above, the United States plays host to over $4.5
trillion in foreign-related bank assets.155 Banking is a volatile industry, and
attracting new business is essential.156 For these reasons, among others, the
United States has entered into several new treaties on the prevention of
double taxation since 2000.157 As noted below, the OECD was well aware
of the need for uniformity in fiscal policies to prevent double taxation and
foster cross-border businesses.
1. OECD and Economic Development.—One of the OECD’s chief
aims as stated in its own Convention was “that the economically more advanced nations should co-operate in assisting to the best of their ability the
countries in process of economic development.”158 None of the countries
that have formed a double taxation treaty with the United States since 2000
are one of the more “economically advanced” nations that belongs to the
OECD.159 The potential tax windfalls explained above would fall strictly on
banks with a parent office in member countries because those countries
adopted and ratified treaties well in advance of nonmember nations. Although U.K. banks could shift capital to other countries to dodge taxes—at
least until the United States and United Kingdom ratified an updated treaty—countries with treaties ratified after the publication of the new commentary could not gain such benefits. Their tax assessment within the United
States would be much higher because their U.S. PEs would be required to
keep all U.S.-generated income on their books. Because NatWest’s home
office and Hong Kong branches received the U.S. PEs’ profits via “loan”
153

Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development art. 3(b), Dec. 14,
1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 141 (emphasis added), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/
7/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html.
154
See id. art. 3 (cross-referencing Article 2’s enumerated undertakings).
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CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 33, at 740.
156
Id.
157
See United States Income Tax Treaties—A to Z, supra note 17. These countries include
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, and Sri Lanka. Id.
158
See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note
153, at pmbl.
159
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, and Sri Lanka are not currently members of the OECD. See Members
and Partners, supra note 58.
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repayments, those PEs could reduce the income on their books even though
the money stayed entirely within the control of NatWest. The branches
could also deduct the interest expense “paid” on these loans. Banks without
such an option would likely have to charge higher interest rates on loans or
find some other means of making up the deficiencies in profits due to the
worse tax treatment.
This OECD principle is also found in the introduction to the Model
Treaty:
It has long been recognized among the Member countries of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development that it is desirable to clarify,
standardize, and confirm the fiscal situation of taxpayers who are engaged in
commercial, industrial, financial, or any other activities in other countries
through the application by all countries of common solutions to identical cases
of double taxation.160

The introduction to the Model Treaty does not state that it is desirable for
“all Member countries” to find common solutions to double taxation problems but rather “all countries.” Yet the NatWest decisions would have the
U.S. apply inconsistent solutions to different countries: U.K. banks can shift
funds to allocate profits to PEs in jurisdictions with more desirable tax
rates, but countries like Sri Lanka do not have such options.
2. OECD and Economic Uniformity.—The NatWest courts placed the
IRS in a difficult situation. All future treaties relying on the Model Treaty
will likely employ the language of the recently released discussion draft on
Article 7.161 Under these future treaties, the IRS could apply the corporate
yardstick approach and the NatWest courts’ methodology would find it acceptable.162 This interpretation gives a distinct business advantage to bank
branches whose parent resides in a country with a preexisting tax treaty
with the United States. Countries with weaker economies, which are unlikely to have long-standing tax treaties with the United States, suffer under
such an interpretation, making it harder for them to compete with banks of
more developed nations. Unless the United States starts rewriting tax treaties every time the OECD issues new commentary, the IRS has little room
to maneuver under the NatWest ruling.
Because the United States relies on the Model Treaty language when
formulating its own tax treaties with other nations, any treaties it now enters
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2008 MODEL TREATY, supra note 65, at 7 (emphasis added).
The OECD issued the Discussion Draft of Article 7 in July of 2008, see ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 144, and finalized and formally incorporated the new language into its
Model Treaty. See Mary Bennett & Raffaele Russo, Discussion Draft on a New Art. 7 of the OECD
Model Convention, 2009 INT’L TRANSFER PRICING J. 73, 73–80.
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See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the recent OECD commentary as it relates to the
corporate yardstick method.
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into will very likely incorporate the new language of Article 7.163 As a result, some U.S. treaties will embody the new language whereas others will
predate it. If new signatory countries must adhere to this new language but
others are free to ignore it, then inconsistency will enter the banking marketplace.
For example, imagine that the United States enters into a tax treaty
with Bhutan based on the Model Treaty next week. As a result, Bhutanese
PEs within the United States would be required to comply with the new Article 7 language, and under the logic of the NatWest decisions,164 the nations
would implicitly have relied on the recent commentary approving the corporate yardstick method. The IRS could attribute hypothetical capital to the
Bhutanese PE under the corporate yardstick method, thus precluding the PE
from shifting its income to foreign branches to dodge the U.S. tax rates.
However, under the NatWest decisions, PEs with home offices in countries
like Japan could amend their prior tax returns and ignore the new Article 7
language and any recent commentary.165 A Japanese bank could shift funds
from its U.S. PEs to its PEs in countries like Hong Kong, where the corporate tax rates are much lower, by having its Hong Kong branches “loan” the
money and the U.S. branches “repay” the loans—deducting the interest expense to boot. Bhutanese PEs in the above hypothetical would not have
such an option. The United States would prefer that Bhutanese PEs not
have that option, but it does give greater advantage to countries with
stronger economies because those are the countries that created the
OECD.166 Application of the approach taken by the NatWest courts would
thus create dramatically different tax consequences for two different banks
competing in the same economic environment. Further, the United States
could conceivably lose billions of dollars in tax revenue because a bank
with a PE in a country with lower corporate tax rates would have an incentive to shift funds away from its U.S. PE even if only for accounting, rather
than operational, purposes.
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The new Article 7 slightly alters the first two paragraphs of the old Article 7 and completely
eliminates paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6. Compare MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL:
CONDENSED VERSION 27–28, art. 7 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 2010), with MODEL TREATY,
supra note 14, at 46–46, art. 7.
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See NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 503 (2003) (rejecting the use of later commentary as not
reflective of the signatory parties’ understanding in 1975).
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Japan and the United States entered into a new treaty in November 2003, which the Senate ratified in March 2004. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, supra note 146. Although the new treaty will prevent future
shifting of funds such as that in the NatWest situation, it does not stop banks from amending prior tax
returns to do what NatWest did. Further, any future issues that might arise could only be addressed by
new commentary, none of which would relevant to the earlier understanding of the signatory parties
under the NatWest decisions.
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Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 153,
at pmbl. (referring to member nations as “the economically more advanced nations”).

1340

105:1317 (2011)

After NatWest: Double Taxation Treaty Interpretation

IV. THE CORPORATE YARDSTICK METHOD
By restricting their focus to the 1963 OECD Commentary and then
looking solely at the commentary on Article 7, the NatWest courts ignored
myriad subsequent commentary supplementing the original Model Treaty.
When courts rely on OECD commentary, they should interpret the commentary more consistently. The NatWest methodology would encourage
inconsistency, however, by applying different rules to banks from different
countries, depending on the date of the treaty. This Part explains both the
need for and logic behind looking to subsequent commentary because this
was indeed part of the shared expectations of parties entering into a double
taxation treaty. It then argues for a specific approach: the corporate
yardstick.
The corporate yardstick approach, which would have the IRS look to
similarly situated bank branches to determine the meaning of “arm’s
length,” is a method the OECD has found to more accurately assess the attribution of profits, as expressed in the commentary.167 Because a bank
dealing with its own branch does not offer the same interest rate that it
would to an actually independent party, the corporate yardstick approach attempts to replicate what an independent transaction would resemble. Although the corporate yardstick approach has its flaws, it is a far more
economically realistic means of handling the attribution of profits to PEs
than relying on a bank branch to honestly report the amount of capital it actually requires.
Had the NatWest courts looked to the commentary that followed the
1975 ratification of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty, they would have realized that the
OECD had addressed and resolved this specific problem. The OECD had
not only addressed the issue of attribution of profits but had also endorsed
the corporate yardstick approach.
A. Recent OECD Commentary: An Evolving View
Following its release of the Model Treaty in 1963, the OECD published commentary to assist and guide nations that relied on the Model
Treaty when drafting their own treaties on the avoidance of double taxation.
The OECD often revises and updates such commentary, or even releases
entirely new commentary when an unanticipated situation confronts a number of member nations.168 After releasing a discussion draft, the OECD ac-
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See MODEL TREATY REPORT, supra note 14, at 82–83, art. 7, cmts. 11–12..
See Centre for Tax Policy and Administration: Publications & Documents, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,3770,en_2649_34897_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
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commentaries, news releases, and other publications.
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cepts suggestions and comments from member nations before drafting and
issuing the final version of the commentary.169
The 2007 commentary on Article 7 begins by noting that Article 7 is
“not particularly detailed” and does not contain any “precise rules” for implementing its general directive, thus allowing a variety of permissible methods to implement the separate-enterprise approach.170 In 2004, the
OECD’s discussion draft emphasized the total lack of “a consensus
amongst Member countries as to the correct interpretation of Article 7.”171
It also noted the “considerable variation in the domestic laws” of the various member countries as to the proper means of taxing PEs.172 The International Fiscal Association (IFA), which each year chooses a monetary topic
at loggerheads in the international community, chose the attribution of profits to PEs for its 2006 convention.173 After receiving branch reports from
members on the status of the topic in their respective countries, the IFA reporters concluded that “there is hardly a single point, be it in the application
of domestic law or in the interpretation of article 7, on which every branch
report agrees.”174
The OECD revisited these issues in 2001, 2003, and 2007. Although it
still found no consensus among member nations on how best to attribute
profits to a PE, the OECD offered three possible methods for attributing
hypothetical capital to a branch that would satisfy Article 7’s separateenterprise principle: the “capital allocation” approach, the “quasi-thin capitalization” approach, and the “thin capitalization” approach.
The capital allocation approach “allocate[s] the bank’s actual ‘free’
capital . . . in accordance with the attribution of financial assets and risks,”
thus leading to an attribution of capital to a PE.175 Under the quasi-thin capitalization approach, a PE is attributed at least the same amount of “free”
capital as would be “required for regulatory purposes . . . [for] an independent banking enterprise operating in the host country.”176 This approach
169

See, e.g., Discussion Draft Release of a New Article 7 (Business Profits) of Its Model Tax
Convention (Revised), ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,
3343,en_2649_33747_44117467_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
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See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REVISED COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 7 OF THE
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION 3 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/2/
38361711.pdf (discussion draft).
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ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS
TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT—PART I (GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS) 6 (2004), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/51/33637685.pdf.
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Id. at 4.
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See Philip Baker & Richard S. Collier, General Report, 91b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL
INTERNATIONAL (2006).
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Id. at 34.
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ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS
TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS (PES): PART II (BANKS) 23 (2003) (emphasis omitted), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/48/2497776.pdf.
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Id. at 24.
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would require attributing to a PE the amount of capital required already as a
pledge of assets—in the case of the United States, a 5% ratio.177 Finally, the
OECD discussed the thin capitalization approach, under which a PE has attributed to it “the same amount of ‘free’ capital as would independent banking enterprises carrying on the same or similar activities under the same or
similar conditions in the jurisdiction of the PE.”178 In other words, a determination would consider how much capital an independent PE would require to operate. The thin capitalization approach is the corporate yardstick
approach by another name—the same approach the NatWest courts rejected.
Noting that each of the three proposals had its strengths and weaknesses, the OECD determined that each was permissible under Article 7(2)
of the Model Treaty.179 All three proposals support the idea that a bank’s
capital should be attributed to its PE by reference to the risks arising from
the PE’s activity.180 None of the approaches looks solely at the branch’s
books to make the determination. Under this more recent commentary, the
IRS would certainly be able to increase NatWest’s taxable income by adjusting its interest expense deduction. Both the OECD’s worldwide determination in NatWest I as well as the Regulation and the IRS’s corporate
yardstick approach in NatWest II conform to the OECD’s evolving views.
In 2008, the OECD formalized the discussion draft as a Report on the
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, Part II of which addressed attributing profits to banks. The report observed a “consensus
amongst governments and business on the principle that a bank
PE . . . should have sufficient capital to support” its operations.181 The report then listed the “authorized approaches” for attributing that capital to a
PE: specifically, the “capital allocation” and “thin capitalization” approaches.182 It still considered the “quasi-thin capitalization” approach to be acceptable but only as an alternative safe harbor.183
The NatWest appellate court did not once mention the vast amount of
commentary released subsequent to the 1975 signing of the U.S.–U.K.
Treaty. Yet it is clear from the various subsequent Commentaries and
Drafts that interpreting Article 7 to allow for a corporate yardstick approach
is not inconsistent with the language of the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.
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B. Hypothesizing Assets and Risks
Having lost the litigation battle, the IRS and the Treasury Department
needed to determine an acceptable way to both comply with the U.S.–U.K.
Treaty, as the courts understood it, and properly tax PEs. When the Treasury Department released Treasury Decision 9465 in September of 2009, it
failed to solve any of the problems resulting from the NatWest litigation.
Treasury Decision 9465 amended Regulation 1.882-5, rejected in the
NatWest decisions as inconsistent with the U.S.–U.K. Treaty.184 But the underlying factors making the Regulation incompatible with the U.S.–U.K.
Treaty are still present in the Regulation. Although the Treasury altered
some of the Regulation’s language, the Treasury did not remove or significantly change parts of the Regulation that involve the determination of
worldwide assets and liabilities.
The Regulation retains the complicated formula for allocating interest
based on a company’s worldwide assets, one of the factors explicitly rejected by the NatWest I court.185 Although the Treasury did make minor adjustments to the method of determination, the actual ratio computation
remained the company’s total worldwide liabilities divided by the total value of its worldwide assets.186 When amending the Regulation, the Treasury
addressed this aspect but did not resolve the issue. Rather, the Treasury
amended the Regulation to return to the fixed-ratio amount, which a branch
can opt for instead of using its actual ratio, to 95%.187 By decreasing the ratio amount and allowing companies to claim only 5% capital, the Treasury
provided an incentive for some companies to choose the fixed amount. A
7% capital ratio is higher than a branch is likely to have, given that it does
not require actual capitalization.188 Five percent, though still high, makes
the default option more attractive. However, banks like NatWest, whose
branches span the globe, will not choose any fixed ratio amount if they can
shift funds to locations in more favorable tax jurisdictions.189
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T.D. 9465, 2009-43 I.R.B. 542.
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(c)(2)(i) (as amended by T.D. 9465, 2009-43 I.R.B. 542).
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Id. In the three-part formula to determine the interest expense deduction, the Treasury increased
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T.D. 9465, 2009-43 I.R.B. 542, at 546. The Treasury changed the original amount of 95% to
93% in 2006. See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(c)(4) (2006).
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NatWest’s branches, for example, had a ratio of between 0.76% and 1.75% (although this ratio is
much lower than the required pledge of assets for a branch). See NatWest II, 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 495
(2003). By contrast, NatWest’s U.S. subsidiary, subject to capitalization requirements, regularly had a
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The IRS and the Treasury probably did not alter the language of the
Regulation because the NatWest courts rejected all of their other options.
Rather, knowing that any subsequent treaties would incorporate the evolving views of the OECD, the Treasury probably kept the Regulation intact
because it is acceptable under the more recent OECD commentary. The
NatWest II court rejected the corporate yardstick approach as an “evolving
view[]” that “does not reflect the understanding of the 1975 Treaty partners.”190 The plain language of the subsequent commentary makes clear
that a corporate yardstick approach is perfectly acceptable under the Model
Treaty. To prevent companies from shifting funds that should be attributed
to a U.S. PE to countries like Hong Kong, the IRS will likely employ this
formula with any country whose treaty does not predate the most recent
commentary.
But why should banks based in countries with treaties predating certain
commentary be given more favorable (or less favorable) tax treatment than
those countries with treaties postdating such commentary? If two different
banks from two different countries are to compete in the same market, a
treaty interpretation favoring one bank over another gives the favored bank
an unwarranted economic advantage. This is especially true when the language of the countries’ respective treaties is identical. The Regulation’s
worldwide determination is only inconsistent with the U.S.–U.K. Treaty to
the extent that a court looks only to commentary available at the time of ratification.
C. Subsequent Commentary: Shared Expectations?
The NatWest courts explicitly rejected the idea of relying on any of this
subsequent commentary.191 It is beyond dispute that the information contained in a discussion draft or subsequent commentary is itself a determination of the drafters. The NatWest II court referred to the more recent
discussion drafts as representing the “continued thinking of the OECD on
attributing capital to branches and its post-1995 evolving views on arm’s
length principles.”192 Under traditional treaty interpretation—or contract interpretation, for that matter—only the commentary available at the time of
treaty ratification should govern a court’s decision. But as noted above,193
although the Model Treaty’s drafters did not anticipate the specific issues
and the resulting commentary, they certainly anticipated that problems
would arise and that commentary would address them. It is for this reason
that, if courts are going to look to OECD commentary at all, they should
look to it in its entirety.
190
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reflect the understandings of the Treaty partners in 1975.”).
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CONCLUSION
Global commerce has greatly evolved since 1975, when the United
States and the United Kingdom signed their treaty on the avoidance of
double taxation. The NatWest courts placed both parties inside an economic bubble, strictly adhering to the language of the Model Treaty and commentary available in 1975. This decision ignored years of subsequent
OECD studies and resolutions of problems unforeseeable in 1975. Yet
countries without tax treaties prior to the 1984, 2003, or 2007 commentaries
and drafts would, upon entering into a tax treaty with the United States, face
significantly different tax consequences than countries with treaties predating such issuances. The result is economic inconsistency among banks,
burdening those from countries whose economies the OECD vowed to help
improve. Future courts should look to the OECD commentary in its entirety, if they intend to rely on it at all. Courts should give the Model Treaty
the very consistency it requires and provide contracting parties with a level
economic playing field.
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